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本文以 2012 年以前在中小板和创业板上市的 499 家家族企业（其中 210 家

































In this paper we investigate whether venture capital firms could affect family firms’ 
management and ownership, and we think all these venture capital’s value-added 
services may influence corporate governance of family firms. To investigate the role 
of venture capital in family firms, we divide our study into three parts. Firstly, the 
phenomenon of family members’ involving in family firms is significant, therefore 
venture capital may choose to force some family managers to quit and replace them 
with unrelated managers. If venture capital does so, what kind of relatives and 
positions would be the target? Secondly, most family firms have dominated ownership, 
and to establish a better ownership structure, will venture capital encourage 
founding-family to sell some shareholdings to outside investors? Lastly, we also want 
to find out whether participate of venture capital in board of directors facilitates the 
value-added practice of venture capital.  
To study these questions, we collect data of 499 family firms （210 venture capital 
-backed family firms and 289 no venture capital-backed family firms） and 1834 
family members. We find it is more likely for venture capital-backed family firms to 
force family managers to quit, and when we divide our sample, we also find affinity 
managers are easier to leave than consanguinity managers, and supervisors are more 
likely to quit than other kinds of managers. Further study shows us venture capital 
-backed family firms are more likely to transfer absolute holding to relative holding, 
and then reduce cash flow rights, control rights and the separation of cash flow rights 
and control rights. Surprisingly, founders and consanguinity managers sell ownership 
to outsiders, but not affinity managers. Lastly, family firms are more willing to 
receive professionalizing services if venture capital acts as director.  
The role of venture capital in professionalizing family firm is unstudied in literature. 
In this paper we investigate whether venture capital firms could affect family firms’ 
management and control, and our research will profitably marry and enrich these two 
fields: family firms and venture capital. Most importantly, we establish a new 
















explore in both family firms and venture capital. 
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